FOIP Goes Northward: Japan’s Maritime Identity and the Defense of Rule of Law in the Arctic

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Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Photo: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

The Arctic Institute Japan Series 2026

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Japan’s Ministry of Defense 2022 Response Strategy on Climate Change explicitly links Arctic environmental changes to national security.¹⁾Ministry of Defense of Japan (2022) Ministry of Defense Response Strategy on Climate Change. https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/meeting/kikouhendou/pdf/taishosenryaku_202208_e.pdf. Accessed on 8 January 2026 The document warns that the melting of sea ice will open new shipping routes, expose seabed resources, and trigger competition among major powers. It highlights risks such as instability from disputes over Arctic resources, China’s advancement into the Arctic via the Sea of Japan, and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) becoming a critical passage. In this framing, climate change operates as a threat multiplier with Arctic warming intensifying geopolitical competition and amplifying vulnerabilities in Japan’s security environment, thus affecting its national defense posture in the Indo-Pacific.

Japan’s broader strategic framework for addressing such challenges is its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) vision, launched by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016.²⁾Abe S (2016) Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI). https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html. Accessed on 8 January 2026 FOIP is Japan’s grand strategy for defending maritime openness and a rules-based order. The vision builds on three pillars: (1) promoting the rule of law and freedom of navigation, (2) enhancing economic prosperity through connectivity, and (3) peace and stability via capacity building and humanitarian assistance. The core principles are further refined to include principles for: (1) fostering peace and rules to promote prosperity, (2) addressing challenges in the Indo-Pacific, (3) establishing connectivity on multiple levels, and (4) extending efforts for security and safe usage measures from maritime to aerial domains.³⁾Kishida F (2023) New Plan for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”: Policy Speech by PM Kishida. https://www.japan.go.jp/kizuna/2023/05/new_plan_for_free_and_open_indo-pacific.html. Accessed on 8 January 2026

For years, FOIP has been understood as a regional strategy with a focus on the waters around Japan, the South China Sea, and the broader Indo-Pacific. Tokyo is now stretching that vision northward notwithstanding the fact that it is not an Arctic state. Japan describes itself as one of the “surrounding states”⁴⁾Cabinet Office of Japan (2015) Japan’s Arctic Policy. https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/english/arctic/pdf/japans_ap_e.pdf. Accessed on 8 January 2026 with respect to the Arctic; a framing that allows it to fold the Arctic into FOIP and treat two distant maritime theaters as parts of a single, integrated ocean policy.

This article argues that this development is driven by two factors. Externally, the convergence of Chinese and Russian ambitions in the Arctic threatens the rules-based order that FOIP seeks to uphold. Internally, Japan’s maritime identity and engagement with northern waters compel it to treat the Arctic as an extension of its maritime corridors and strategic horizon. Combined, these factors, or pressure points, reshape FOIP’s logic to extend its principles into the Arctic.

Arctic Militarization and the Defense of the Rule of Law in the Arctic

Systemically, the Arctic is becoming a focal point of strategic militarization, as major powers like Russia and China expand their presence and capabilities in pursuit of geopolitical influence, resource control, and dominance over emerging maritime routes.

Russia’s Arctic military posture centers on air and maritime early warning and defense. It includes the reopening of 50 Soviet‑era bases, refurbishment of 13 airfields and 10 radar stations, expansion of 20 border posts and 10 rescue outposts, and the deployment of special forces within an Arctic Brigade for exercises and training.⁵⁾Conley HA, Melino M & Alterman JB (2020) The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 March, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence. Accessed on 8 January 2026 Russia also operates more than 40 icebreakers.⁶⁾Ministry of Transport of Russia (2024) Ледокольный флот России – самый мощный в мире (Russia’s icebreaker fleet is the most powerful in the world). https://mintrans.gov.ru/press-center/news/11115. Accessed on 8 January 2026

Particularly, the NSR, which runs along Russia’s Arctic coast, is under Moscow’s control.⁷⁾Todorov A (2023) New Russian law on Northern Sea route navigation: Gathering Arctic Storm or tempest in a teapot?. The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 9 March, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/new-russian-law-northern-sea-route-navigation-gathering-arctic-storm-or-tempest-teapot. Accessed on 8 January 2026 To claim regulatory authority, Russia invokes Article 234 of the UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) which permits coastal states to set rules for ships traveling through ice-covered waters in their exclusive economic zones mainly for environmental protection. This includes requiring advance permits, mandatory pilotage, and icebreaker escorts. While Moscow has actively promoted the NSR as a global energy corridor for Arctic oil and LNG exports,⁸⁾Nong H (2025) Russia’s Arctic Bet: Can Asia Deliver on NSR Ambitions?. The Diplomat, 19 June, https://thediplomat.com/2025/06/russias-arctic-bet-can-asia-deliver-on-nsr-ambitions/. Accessed on 8 January 2026 many fear such moves could weaponize access as geopolitical leverage, conditioning passage on political compliance or restricting transit during crises.

Meanwhile, China has declared itself a “near-Arctic state”⁹⁾State Council (2018) China’s Arctic Policy. https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. Accessed on 8 January 2026 despite being far from the Arctic Circle. It backs this claim with growing interests and capabilities: a fleet of 5 icebreakers,¹⁰⁾Katz J (2024) ICE Pact: Why the US had to recruit help in race with Russia, China for Arctic icebreakers. Breaking Defense, 16 August, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/08/ice-pact-why-the-us-had-to-recruit-help-in-race-with-russia-china-for-arctic-icebreakers/. Accessed on 8 January 2026 the Polar Silk Road initiative under the Belt and Road framework, and increasingly regular research voyages that serve dual-use purposes.¹¹⁾Legarda H (2025) The Arctic, outer space and influence-building: China and Russia join forces to expand in new strategic frontiers. Mercator Institute for China Studies, https://merics.org/en/report/arctic-outer-space-and-influence-building-china-and-russia-join-forces-expand-new-strategic. Accessed on 8 January 2026

Japan sees these developments through two lenses. The first lens is revisionist threats. Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy identifies China as a revisionist power and Russia as a violator of sovereignty, presenting them as dimensions of a unified threat to maritime order.¹²⁾Cabinet Office of Japan (2022) National Security Strategy of Japan. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf. Accessed on 8 January 2026 The second lens is Japan’s alliance with the US. From the Arctic, Chinese forces could threaten the US East Coast as easily as the West; a scenario which Tokyo believes could potentially undermine its own strategic interests.¹³⁾Victorovich SD (2021) The Russian vector of Japan’s policy in the Arctic. Russian Japanology Review 2: 5–28. https://doi.org/10.24412/2658-6444-2021-2-5-28

In response, Japan has begun to operationalize FOIP’s security aspects in the Arctic. In September 2020,¹⁴⁾中央日報 (2020) 海上自衛隊艦が史上初の北極海航海…「北極戦争」に加勢か: Maritime Self-Defense Force ship sailed the Arctic Sea for the first time in history… Joining the “Arctic War.” 中央日報, 22 November, https://s.japanese.joins.com/JArticle/272541?sectcode=A00&servcode. Accessed on 8 January 2026 the Maritime Self-Defense Force entered the Arctic Ocean for the first time when the training ship Kashima sailed through the Bering Strait into the Arctic Circle with about 310 crew and trainees. The voyage, though symbolic and marked by an onboard “Arctic Festival” (北極祭), signaled Japan’s intent to assert strategic presence and build operational familiarity in a contested space. Furthermore, conducted in concert with the US, the deployment was intended as a form of silent pressure and deterrence against Russian and Chinese ambitions, as explained by Keishi Ono, the Director of International Exchange and Libraries at the National Institute for Defense Studies, in discussion with the author in March 2024.

Moreover, Japan is diversifying its Arctic partnerships. It has deepened bilateral¹⁵⁾Jiji Press (2023) Russian Foreign Minister Says No Territorial Dispute With Japan. The Japan News, 19 December, https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/world/russia/20231219-156538/. Accessed on 8 January 2026 ties with other Arctic states and it continues to actively participate¹⁶⁾Enzmann J (2025) Japan’s engagement in the Arctic and Third Pole regions. The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 9 April, https://www.spf.org/en/spfnews/information/20250409.html. Accessed on 8 January 2026 in multilateral institutions like the Arctic Council (AC). These efforts allow Japan to advance FOIP’s rule of law pillar by supporting UNCLOS-based governance, its connectivity pillar through joint shipping and energy projects, and its stability pillar via scientific cooperation and capacity building. In doing so, Japan reduces overdependence on any single ally and embeds FOIP principles into a broader coalition of Arctic stakeholders.

Contextualised this way, it is reasonable to assert that Arctic militarization has incentivised Japan to adapt its FOIP to a new maritime theater where sovereignty is diffuse, alliances are fluid, and governance norms remain unsettled. By responding to the strategic assertiveness of China and Russia in the region, Japan is reacting to external threats while actively extending FOIP into the Arctic. More broadly, the Arctic deployment and Japan’s growing engagement in Arctic institutions demonstrate how FOIP is being operationalized beyond its original Indo-Pacific focus.

Japan’s Maritime Identity and the Domestic Logic of its Arctic Engagement

Historical Engagement

Japan’s Arctic engagement is rooted in a maritime identity that links northern waters to national survival and strategic imagination. As early as the 1930s-1940s, Tokyo closely monitored Soviet Arctic exploration and the development of the NSR, viewing it through a maritime security lens.¹⁷⁾Lomaeva M & Saunavaara J (2022) Japan Facing the Arctic and North: Interplay Between the National and Regional Interests, in Arctic Fever. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 393–428. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9616-9_15 Particularly, Japan’s imperial government was concerned about its “northern fisheries,” especially crab and salmon stocks off the Soviet coast and in the Bering Sea, which were important to its coastal economy.¹⁸⁾Polutov A (2016) Japan and Soviet Arctic: Military history aspect (1932—1945). Russia and the Pacific, 69–82. http://riatr.ru/2016/1/Russia_and_ATR_2016-1_069-082.pdf. Accessed on 1 January 2026

Japan’s Arctic involvement took off in 1957 when a Hokkaido University professor led a research expedition to Greenland.¹⁹⁾Hataya S (2025) Japan’s Arctic Policy. Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, 14 July, https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/07/japans-arctic-policy/. Accessed on 9 January 2026 In 1991, Japan became the first non-Arctic country to establish a permanent observation station in Norway’s Svalbard archipelago. Tokyo was also present at the founding of the AC in 1996 though it was not until 2013 when it gained AC observer status alongside China, India, Singapore, and South Korea; a development that was interpreted as a sign of growing Asian interest in the region. Between 1993 and 1999, last but certainly not least, Japan co-led with Norway and Russia the International Northern Sea Route Programme which mapped out future shipping opportunities.

This long-standing presence shapes how Japan interprets and implements FOIP. Its decades of Arctic engagement through scientific diplomacy, multilateral cooperation, and sustainable development mirror FOIP’s principles of a rules-based maritime order. Rather than treating the Arctic as a new frontier, Japan sees it as a familiar maritime space where it can extend FOIP’s principles.

Hokkaidō as Arctic Gateway

Within that context, Hokkaidō has been central to Japan’s Arctic identity.²⁰⁾Mason MM (2012) Dominant narratives of colonial Hokkaido and imperial Japan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137330888 The name Hokkaidō (北海道), literally meaning “Northern Sea Route” or “Road to the Northern Sea,” was adopted in 1869 by the Meiji government to replace the older name Ezochi. The name echoes a deeper imperial logic of connectivity to link distant peripheries to the maritime center of the Japanese state. The name also reflects the island’s geographic position. Compared to other East Asian ports, it is geographically closer to Arctic sea routes like the NSR. This makes Hokkaidō a “natural” Arctic hub for Arctic logistics and research.²¹⁾Saunavaara J (2017) The changing Arctic & the development of Hokkaido, in Arctic Yearbook 2017, 1–13. https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2017/Scholarly_Papers/18_The_Changing_Arctic.pdf. Accessed on 1 January 2026

Hokkaidō and its capital, Sapporo, have also actively redefined their northernness through concepts like hoppōken (北方圏, Northern Region²²⁾Hasanat MW (2011) International cooperation in the Northern Forum: emerging new norms in international law?. Polar Record, 48(4): 372–386. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0032247411000404 and “winter city”,²³⁾World Winter Cities Association for Mayors (no date) What is a “Winter City”? https://wwcam.org/en/about/definition. Accessed on 9 January 2026 enabling both local and national officials to align with Arctic and sub-Arctic cities facing similar climatic challenges. These frameworks have helped bridge the latitude gap between Japan and the Arctic, allowing Hokkaidō to participate in interregional forums such as the Northern Forum and the World Winter Cities Association for Mayors. Through these platforms, it has built direct ties with cities in Russia, Canada, and Scandinavia. Sapporo, in particular, has leveraged its “winter city” identity to host international conferences and build partnerships with cities like Norilsk²⁴⁾World Winter Cities Association for Mayors (no date) 2019 Working-Level Officials Meeting in Norilsk. https://wwcam.org/en/activity/wlom/2019-working-level-officials-meeting. Accessed on 9 January 2026 and Magadan.²⁵⁾World Winter Cities Association for Mayors (no date) First Mayors Conference. https://wwcam.org/en/activity/mc/first-mayors-conference. Accessed on 9 January 2026 This regional diplomacy supports FOIP by promoting peace and stability through capacity building and cooperation.

Policy Integration

Japan’s national institutions have integrated the Arctic into its oceanic strategy to align the Arctic with FOIP’s global orientation. The Headquarters for Ocean Policy and the Arctic Liaison Committee coordinate across ministries to ensure that Japan can achieve multiple objectives in the Arctic through FOIP.²⁶⁾Tonami A (2014) The Arctic policy of China and Japan: multi-layered economic and strategic motivations. The Polar Journal, 4(1): 105–126. https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896x.2014.913931 The Arctic was first mentioned in the 2013 Second Basic Plan on Ocean Policy with a particular emphasis on environmental monitoring and shipping routes.²⁷⁾Cabinet Office of Japan (2013) The Second Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/english/plan/pdf/plan02_e.pdf. Accessed on 9 January 2026 This narrow focus was further broadened in 2015 when Japan formally adopted its 2015 Arctic Policy which outlines three priorities: research and development, international cooperation, and sustainable use.²⁸⁾Cabinet Office of Japan (2015) Japan’s Arctic Policy. https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/english/arctic/pdf/japans_ap_e.pdf. Accessed on 8 January 2026

Importantly, the 2018 Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy explicitly incorporates the Arctic into Japan’s broader oceanic strategy, identifying the region as critical for “maintaining and developing a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law.”²⁹⁾Cabinet Office of Japan (2018) The Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/english/plan/pdf/plan03_e.pdf. Accessed on 9 January 2026 This language mirrors FOIP principles, ensuring that Arctic policy advances the same objectives Japan pursues in the Indo‑Pacific. The 2022 Japan-Canada Action Plan reinforces this alignment by explicitly including “Maintaining Maritime Order in the Arctic” within Indo-Pacific cooperation.³⁰⁾Global Affairs Canada (2022) Action Plan: Canada-Japan 6 Shared Priorities. https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/10/backgrounder–action-plan-canada-japan-6-shared-priorities.html. Accessed on 9 January 2026 It also commits both countries to continued collaboration on maritime governance, including efforts to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

Enhancing Connectivity through Arctic Shipping and Energy Routes

Strategically, Japan views Arctic sea routes as vital to its long-term (energy) security given the fact that it imports close to 96% of its energy needs.³¹⁾Zhu D et al. (2020) Analysis of the robustness of energy supply in Japan: Role of renewable energy. Energy Reports 6: 378–391. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2020.01.011 The NSR in particular has received the most attention in Japanese policy circles due to its tangible benefits as an emerging maritime shortcuts between Japan and Europe. Compared to the traditional Suez Canal route, NSR reduces Asia-Europe shipping distances by up to 36–40% (~7,200 km) and voyage times by 10–15 days.³²⁾Young OR, Kim JD & Kim YH (eds) (2013) The Arctic in World Affairs: A North Pacific Dialogue on the Future of the Arctic. The Korea Maritime Institute and The East-West Center. https://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/filemanager/pubs/pdfs/Arctic2013/2013arctic-03shipping.pdf. Accessed on 9 January 2026 Meanwhile, traffic alongside the NSR route is on the rise; in 2025, for instance, it recorded 103 full transits by 88 vessels carrying about 3.2 million tons of cargo.³³⁾Humpert M (2025) Northern Sea Route 2025 season concludes with stable transit traffic amid challenging ice conditions. High North News, 11 December, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/northern-sea-route-2025-season-concludes-stable-transit-traffic-amid-challenging-ice-conditions. Accessed on 9 January 2026 For a trading and import-dependent nation like Japan, this emerging route advances FOIP’s principles of economic prosperity through maritime openness, and hence it provides an advantage and opportunity that Japan simply cannot afford to miss.

At the same time, Japan’s reliance on Russian Arctic energy underscores the tension between energy security and geopolitical risk. In 2023, Russia was Japan’s third-largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplier accounting for 9.3% of total imports.³⁴⁾Azhari K (2025) Takaichi informed Trump: Japan cannot withdraw from LNG project with Russia. Arab News Japan, 30 October, https://www.arabnews.jp/en/business/article_158039/. Accessed on 9 January 2026 Despite sanctions and geopolitical tensions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Japan has secured a US waiver to continue LNG imports from Sakhalin-2³⁵⁾Jiji Press (2025) Japan hails U.S. extension of Sakhalin-2 LNG import permit. The Japan Times, 18 December, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/12/18/japan/japan-us-extension-sakhalin-permit/. Accessed on 9 January 2026 and maintain involvement in Arctic LNG 2³⁶⁾Tass (2025) JOGMEC not planning to exit from Arctic LNG 2 project — EVP. TASS, 10 July, https://tass.com/economy/1987887. Accessed on 9 January 2026 and Sakhalin-1. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi defended the exemption by citing the difficulty of securing alternative sources and warning that Japan’s withdrawal could open the door for China to acquire a stake in these strategic offshore energy projects. This reflects a pragmatic effort to prevent China from monopolizing strategic energy projects, thereby safeguarding FOIP’s broader objective of balanced connectivity.

Building on this immediate focus on the NSR, Japan’s Arctic strategy also considers the broader spectrum of emerging polar routes, weighing operational feasibility, geopolitical constraints, and long-term governance opportunities. The Northwest Passage (NWP), while technically a shorter route between Asia and North America than the Panama Canal, remains peripheral to Japan’s shipping plans.³⁷⁾Khon VC et al. (2009) Perspectives of Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage in the twenty-first century. Climatic Change, 100(3–4): 757–768, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-009-9683-2 Persistent heavy ice, limited infrastructure, high insurance costs, and the legal uncertainty surrounding Canada’s sovereignty claim make the NWP a less reliable option.³⁸⁾Barnes J (2025) Explainer: The Northwest Passage’s shipping potential, legal status, and what’s at stake. The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 28 July, https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/explainer-northwest-passages-shipping-potential-legal-status-and-whats-stake. Accessed on 9 January 2026 Even as climate change gradually improves navigability, these structural and regulatory obstacles mean the NWP is unlikely to play a central role in Japanese Arctic shipping strategy in the near term.

By contrast, the Transpolar Sea Route (TSR)³⁹⁾Humpert M & Raspotnik A (2012) The Future of Arctic Shipping along the Transpolar Sea Route. The Arctic Institute, 27 November, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/future-arctic-shipping-transpolar-sea-route/. Accessed on 9 January 2026 represents a future-oriented opportunity that aligns closely with Japan’s FOIP-driven objectives. Running across the Central Arctic Ocean above the North Pole, the TSR would avoid the territorial waters of both Russia and Canada, thereby reducing geopolitical friction and enabling multilateral management under UNCLOS frameworks. Although commercial use remains a longer-term prospect, Japan is actively preparing for the route’s potential through scientific research, policy engagement, and participation in multilateral governance initiatives such as the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement (CAOFA).⁴⁰⁾Shahbazi A (2021) Sustaining Tomorrow’s Central Arctic Ocean Today: Using Best Practices to Guide the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement’s Implementation. https://www.worldwildlife.org/documents/452/7zhj2wrz1i_CAOFA_Full_Report_pages_web_version.pdf. Accessed on 9 January 2026 Programs like the Arctic Challenge for Sustainability II,⁴¹⁾Nishino S et al. (2025) Japanese Arctic projects’ contributions to the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement. Polar Science 45: 101210. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polar.2025.101210 moreover, integrate applied research with policy development, and hence enable Japanese scientists to shape environmental standards, monitoring protocols, and governance norms in the Central Arctic Ocean.

Taken together, Japan’s Arctic engagement reflects a clear hierarchy of priorities: immediate utilisation of the NSR for its relative logistical efficiency and energy access, strategic preparation for the TSR as a rules-based, multilateral corridor for the future, and limited focus on the NWP due to operational and legal constraints. In this way, Japan leverages Arctic shipping and energy routes not only to secure economic and energy interests but also to extend FOIP principles, promote maritime openness, and establish a normative presence in the governance of the Central Arctic Ocean.

Conclusion

This analysis demonstrates how the Arctic fits into Japan’s FOIP grand strategy linking the two maritime theaters of the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic. Externally, the convergence of Chinese and Russian ambitions in the Arctic threatens the rules-based order that FOIP is designed to uphold. Internally, shaped by historical engagement, regional geography, and energy dependence, Japan’s maritime identity compels it to view the Arctic as an extension of its strategic space.

In operational terms, Japan advances FOIP’s principles in the Arctic by upholding the rule of law through support for UNCLOS and multilateral governance, enhancing connectivity through Arctic shipping and energy routes, and promoting peace and stability through scientific diplomacy and coalition-building. The prioritisation of the NSR for immediate economic and energy security, coupled with preparatory engagement in the TSR as a multilateral, rules-based future route, exemplifies this strategic calibration, while the NWP remains a secondary concern due to structural and legal constraints.

These dynamics carry broader implications for middle powers navigating an era of intensified great power competition. By conceptualising distant regions as extensions of their strategic geography and leveraging historical experience, institutional frameworks, and normative influence, this category of state actors can project power, diversify strategic dependencies, and actively contribute to the governance of global commons. Japan’s Arctic engagement, thus, demonstrates how middle powers can operationalise strategy to safeguard national interests while shaping emerging international and regional orders.

Khang Pham is a Master’s candidate in International Relations at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Japan. Pham’s research is centered around Climate Security with a regional focus on Asia-Pacific and the Arctic.